These days we expect our sciences to have a practical side. We understand how things work and make use of the knowledge.
Science began as common sense put into theoretical shape by Aristotle. Thus, pretty much every advanced science has begun by showing what common sense missed and Aristotle got wrong. So common sense says the sun revolves around the earth. Then Aristotle developed a theory of physics that took common sense observations for granted. Aristotle’s physics, however, was purely theoretical without practical benefit.
Copernicus, Galileo and Newton overturned that common sense and introduced a more modern physics. The proof of the new science was that it led to practical applications, first in mechanics and later in space travel.
At the time of Galileo, Rene Descartes was also introducing a new theory of physics, one that relied solely on logical hypotheses and deduction. Although widely admired at the time, this work has not held up. For one thing, it did not address the common sense of earlier ages, for another it led to no practical or explanatory work.
Sixty years ago the study of language grew radical without addressing common sense or Aristotle. The common-sense proposition was that language is meaningful, and the Aristotelean theory was that language works by combining sounds with meaning. Reasonable as this definition sounds, nobody ever figured out how to use it and the practical traditions of rhetoric and composition pay no attention to Aristotle.
The linguistics’ movement of the late 1950s also ignored Aristotle and common sense. It pursued questions based on the logical hypothesis that language is a computation. Interestingly, the movement was led by a young thinker whose great hero was Descartes, and like Descartes, the movement’s work has led to no practical or explanatory success. It answers none of the traditional questions about language—e.g., Why are there so many and how can they be so different? What is meaning? How could it have begun? –and offers no practical clues to using language more effectively, or translating texts, or improving speech therapy, or overcoming dyslexia.
The problem seems to lie at the assumption that sentences are computations. On its own, the idea has some plausibility. If the brain is a computer, its output must be a computation. In computations, however, the same input produces the same result. In language, the result is not so predictable. If I participate in a soccer game and must report what just happened, I might say I kicked the ball or I sent the ball flying or The ball really jumped off my toe or I missed the goal or Joe was racing for the ball but I beat him to it or … and on and on ad infinitum.
This observation brings us back to meaning. Our utterances depend on what we have to say and language seems to communicate meaning. Could Aristotle have been right after all?
No. The proposition that language combines sound with meaning cannot be correct. The problem is that meaning is not a physical thing that we can somehow combine with sound waves. It is a ghost that Aristotle inserted into language back when inserting ghosts was no vice. He also inserting yearning into his list of elements: fire yearned to be high in the sky and rose toward the sun; earth yearned to go to the center of the world, so earthen matter fell and even accelerated as it approached its goal.
Kicking out the ghosts of physics was not easy because the things that Aristotle explained still needed explaining. The solution lay in saying that the rising smoke and falling meteors are effects of gravity.
My work on this blog has likewise persuaded me that meaning is an effect, rather than a cause.
The simplest example might be two people standing together when one of them points toward something. The other looks over and sees a policeman beating a man. The gesture directed the other’s attention. The meaning of the gesture came when the second person redirected attention and saw something new.
Suppose instead, one person tells another, “I saw a cop beating up a guy today.” The meaning is discovered by the same general principle of directing attention, the difference being that instead of directing a person’s eyes, the speaker directs the listener’s imagination. In both cases, the meaning is the result of the directed attention.
This reversal of meaning changes the task of speaker/writer. Instead of focusing on inserting meanings, the task to skillful language production lies in producing sentences that the audience can follow. How do we do that? By paying attention to the demands we place on the listeners’ attention.
The old man the boat. Oh, I’m sorry, did I lose you? It is not surprising. A reader first takes “The old man” as a noun phrase and needs a second look to grasp that “man” is a verb. This kind of sentence, known as a garden-path, is well known in linguistics and is strong evidence that listeners construct meaning as they go along. If they go astray, they must retrace their route, looking for the point where they got lost.
The old suffer many indignities. I hope that sentence was easier to follow. Why was it so? Because readers know to shift their attention from the old to suffer. This sentences helps the reader by making it easy to shift attention.
I have published a few papers on line (here and here) demonstrating that syntax directs attention, and that oddities proposed to illustrate a universal grammar can be readily explained as devices for directing attention.
I have been a decent writer for many years, but I am a better one now because I understand how to help readers make their way through complex sentences. So there has been a practical benefit to my years of wrestling with how language works. At last, rhetoric may be given a clear, theoretical footing.
I also think like you. There are very few talented people in these two areas in our country.
Posted by: Yürüyüş Yolu | January 13, 2020 at 06:53 AM